Fix default editor handling, bug 286017.

(Portage version: 2.2_rc50/cvs/Linux i686)

2 files changed, 219 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog b/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog
index 86390ae53725..f025145e261f 100644
--- a/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 # ChangeLog for app-admin/sudo
 # Copyright 1999-2009 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog,v 1.195 2009/10/09 17:48:38 armin76 Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/ChangeLog,v 1.196 2009/11/21 22:10:27 ulm Exp $
+
+*sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1 (21 Nov 2009)
+
+  21 Nov 2009; Ulrich Mueller <ulm@gentoo.org> +sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1.ebuild:
+  Fix default editor handling, bug 286017.
 
   09 Oct 2009; Raúl Porcel <armin76@gentoo.org> sudo-1.7.2_p1.ebuild:
   arm/ia64/m68k/s390/sh/sparc stable wrt #284089
diff --git a/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1.ebuild b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4ec5898df72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2009 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-admin/sudo/sudo-1.7.2_p1-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2009/11/21 22:10:27 ulm Exp $
+
+inherit eutils pam confutils autotools
+
+MY_P=${P/_/}
+MY_P=${MY_P/beta/b}
+
+case "${P}" in
+	*_beta* | *_rc*)
+		uri_prefix=beta/
+		;;
+	*)
+		uri_prefix=""
+		;;
+esac
+
+DESCRIPTION="Allows users or groups to run commands as other users"
+HOMEPAGE="http://www.sudo.ws/"
+SRC_URI="ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/${uri_prefix}${MY_P}.tar.gz"
+# Basic license is ISC-style as-is, some files are released under
+# 3-clause BSD license
+LICENSE="as-is BSD"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
+IUSE="pam skey offensive ldap selinux"
+
+DEPEND="pam? ( virtual/pam )
+	ldap? (
+		>=net-nds/openldap-2.1.30-r1
+		dev-libs/cyrus-sasl
+	)
+	skey? ( >=sys-auth/skey-1.1.5-r1 )
+	app-editors/gentoo-editor
+	virtual/mta"
+RDEPEND="selinux? ( sec-policy/selinux-sudo )
+	ldap? ( dev-lang/perl )
+	pam? ( sys-auth/pambase )
+	${DEPEND}"
+DEPEND="${DEPEND} sys-devel/bison"
+
+S=${WORKDIR}/${MY_P}
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	confutils_use_conflict skey pam
+}
+
+src_unpack() {
+	unpack ${A}; cd "${S}"
+
+	# compatability fix.
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-skeychallengeargs.diff
+
+	# additional variables to disallow, should user disable env_reset.
+
+	# NOTE: this is not a supported mode of operation, these variables
+	#       are added to the blacklist as a convenience to administrators
+	#       who fail to heed the warnings of allowing untrusted users
+	#       to access sudo.
+	#
+	#       there is *no possible way* to foresee all attack vectors in
+	#       all possible applications that could potentially be used via
+	#       sudo, these settings will just delay the inevitable.
+	#
+	#       that said, I will accept suggestions for variables that can
+	#       be misused in _common_ interpreters or libraries, such as
+	#       perl, bash, python, ruby, etc., in the hope of dissuading
+	#       a casual attacker.
+
+	# XXX: perl should be using suid_perl.
+	# XXX: users can remove/add more via env_delete and env_check.
+	# XXX: <?> = probably safe enough for most circumstances.
+
+	einfo "Blacklisting common variables (env_delete)..."
+		sudo_bad_var() {
+			local target='env.c' marker='\*initial_badenv_table\[\]'
+
+			ebegin "	$1"
+			sed -i 's#\(^.*'${marker}'.*$\)#\1\n\t"'${1}'",#' "${S}"/${target}
+			eend $?
+		}
+
+		sudo_bad_var 'PERLIO_DEBUG'   # perl, write debug to file.
+		sudo_bad_var 'FPATH'          # ksh, search path for functions.
+		sudo_bad_var 'NULLCMD'        # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'READNULLCMD'    # zsh, command on null-redir. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'GLOBIGNORE'     # bash, glob paterns to ignore. <?>
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONHOME'     # python, module search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONPATH'     # python, search path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'PYTHONINSPECT'  # python, allow inspection.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYLIB'        # ruby, lib load path.
+		sudo_bad_var 'RUBYOPT'        # ruby, cl options.
+		sudo_bad_var 'ZDOTDIR'        # zsh, path to search for dotfiles.
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# prevent binaries from being stripped.
+	sed -i 's/\($(INSTALL).*\) -s \(.*[(sudo|visudo)]\)/\1 \2/g' Makefile.in
+
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${MY_P}-securepath.patch
+
+	eautoconf
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	local line ROOTPATH
+
+	# FIXME: secure_path is a compile time setting. using ROOTPATH
+	# is not perfect, env-update may invalidate this, but until it
+	# is available as a sudoers setting this will have to do.
+	einfo "Setting secure_path..."
+
+		# why not use grep? variable might be expanded from other variables
+		# declared in that file. cannot just source the file, would override
+		# any variables already set.
+		eval `PS4= bash -x /etc/profile.env 2>&1 | \
+			while read line; do
+				case $line in
+					ROOTPATH=*) echo $line; break;;
+					*) continue;;
+				esac
+			done`  && einfo "	Found ROOTPATH..." || \
+				ewarn "	Failed to find ROOTPATH, please report this."
+
+		# remove duplicate path entries from $1
+		cleanpath() {
+			local i=1 x n IFS=:
+			local -a paths;	paths=($1)
+
+			for ((n=${#paths[*]}-1;i<=n;i++)); do
+				for ((x=0;x<i;x++)); do
+					test "${paths[i]}" == "${paths[x]}" && {
+						einfo "	Duplicate entry ${paths[i]} removed..." 1>&2
+						unset paths[i]; continue 2; }
+				done; # einfo "	Adding ${paths[i]}..." 1>&2
+			done; echo "${paths[*]}"
+		}
+
+		ROOTPATH=$(cleanpath /bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/opt/bin${ROOTPATH:+:${ROOTPATH}})
+
+		# strip gcc path (bug #136027)
+		rmpath() {
+			declare e newpath oldpath=${!1} PATHvar=$1 thisp IFS=:
+			shift
+			for thisp in $oldpath; do
+				for e; do [[ $thisp == $e ]] && continue 2; done
+				newpath=$newpath:$thisp
+			done
+			eval $PATHvar='${newpath#:}'
+		}
+
+		rmpath ROOTPATH '*/gcc-bin/*'
+
+	einfo "...done."
+
+	# XXX: --disable-path-info closes an info leak, but may be confusing.
+	econf --with-secure-path="${ROOTPATH}" \
+		--with-editor=/usr/libexec/gentoo-editor \
+		--with-env-editor \
+		$(use_with offensive insults) \
+		$(use_with offensive all-insults) \
+		$(use_with pam) \
+		$(use_with skey) \
+		$(use_with ldap ldap_conf_file /etc/ldap.conf.sudo) \
+		$(use_with ldap) || die
+
+	emake || die
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	emake DESTDIR="${D}" install || die
+	dodoc ChangeLog HISTORY PORTING README TROUBLESHOOTING \
+		UPGRADE WHATSNEW sample.sudoers sample.syslog.conf
+
+	if use ldap; then
+		dodoc README.LDAP schema.OpenLDAP
+		dosbin sudoers2ldif
+
+		cat - > "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo <<EOF
+# See ldap.conf(5) and README.LDAP for details\n"
+# This file should only be readable by root\n\n"
+# supported directives: host, port, ssl, ldap_version\n"
+# uri, binddn, bindpw, sudoers_base, sudoers_debug\n"
+# tls_{checkpeer,cacertfile,cacertdir,randfile,ciphers,cert,key
+EOF
+
+		insinto /etc
+		doins "${T}"/ldap.conf.sudo
+		fperms 0440 /etc/ldap.conf.sudo
+	fi
+
+	pamd_mimic system-auth sudo auth account password session
+
+	insinto /etc
+	doins "${S}"/sudoers
+	fperms 0440 /etc/sudoers
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	if use ldap; then
+		ewarn
+		ewarn "sudo uses the /etc/ldap.conf.sudo file for ldap configuration."
+		ewarn
+		if egrep -q '^[[:space:]]*sudoers:' "${ROOT}"/etc/nsswitch.conf; then
+			ewarn "In 1.7 series, LDAP is no more consulted, unless explicitly"
+			ewarn "configured in /etc/nsswitch.conf."
+			ewarn
+			ewarn "To make use of LDAP, add this line to your /etc/nsswitch.conf:"
+			ewarn "  sudoers: ldap files"
+			ewarn
+		fi
+	fi
+}